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Research regarding the illusion of control was dominated by the studies examining 
the effect of depressive affect on the overestimation of control over uncontrollable events. 
However, the relative contributions of high Negative Affect (NA) and low Positive Affect 
(PA), as underlying dimensions of depressive states, has remained unclear. This study 
researched how both PA and NA had affected the illusion of control. Two weeks before illusion 
induction, trait PA and NA of 54 first-year university students were assessed, and just before 
and after illusion induction task their state forms were estimated. The induction consisted of 
solving unsolvable tasks and obtaining positive feedback for all the answers. The illusion 
of control was significantly correlated with all three PA scores, and none of the NA. After 
controlling for trait measures, the PA after illusion induction remained the only significant 
predictor of illusion. The relation of positive affect and illusory judgement in maintaining 
mental health were discussed.
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In situations like games of chance there is no real influence the player 
has on the outcome. The player has minimal control over the win or loss: he 
can decide whether or not to buy a lottery ticket, whether to go to a specific 
casino or not, and the like. However, people, and gamblers in particular, tend to 
overestimate their ability to control gambling events and feel they can control 
outcomes that they have no influence over. They usually think their success is 
credited to buying a lottery ticket at a specific vendor, sitting at their “lucky” 
table in the casino, throwing dice with a specific movement of their hand, or 
to the help of some magical rituals, or lucky charms. This phenomenon of 
overestimating an individual’s control in chance situations is known as “the 
illusion of control”.
This notion was introduced by Elen Langer (1975) who defined it „as an 
expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the 
objective probability would warrant“ (Langer, 1975; p. 313). Since Langer’s 
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paper was published, the concept of illusion of control has been significantly 
broadend, and in order to produce it, researchers manipulated conditions that led 
people to make overgeneralised judgments of control, contingency, prediction 
ability, etc. In a meta-analytical study on the illusion of control, Presson and 
Benassi (1996) reported that over the years different studies have used different 
operational definitions of illusion of control. These definitions can be classified 
as: prediction of the success probability, determination of contingency, control 
estimation and ambiguous acts that are difficult to classify in one of the previous 
three classes. Presson and Benassi (1996), therefore, suggested that the term 
“illusory judgment” would better cover different cognitive processes induced 
and measured under the label “illusion of control”.
Explanations of the illusion of control
Langer (1975) listed several reasons why people overestimate their 
control over random outcomes. First, control is desirable because of its adaptive 
function – control allows for having power over an environment. Second, when 
the control is really low or impossible, illusion of control can be a significant 
factor in reduction of anxiety caused by the absence of influence. As the illusion 
of control usually occurs in situations that are similar to skill based tasks, Langer 
argued that the similarity of „skill tasks“ and „chance tasks“ could also mislead 
people into illusion of control.
Thompson et al. (Thompson et al., 2004) explained illusion of control by 
“control heuristics” – simple rules used while determining the level of control 
over situations. They suppose that two factors are responsible for emergence 
of illusion of control. The first factor, intentionality in producing an effect, 
strengthens the impression that just experienced situation is the consequence of 
our behaviour – that the situation actually is under our control. Second factor, 
connectedness, refers to an association between behaviour and the outcome. If 
certain behaviour and a situation are closely related in time, there is a tendency 
for people to observe them as causally related.
Taylor and Brown (1988) considered overestimating control to be one of 
the positive, self-enhancement illusions which serve to maintain, improve, and 
defend mental health. The illusion of control is probably the result of a person’s 
effort to assimilate uncertain and contradicting data about the world and the 
self into the positive self-scheme. It happens automatically and with minimal 
processing, with a clear purpose to maintaining of a positive self-view. Positive 
illusions are maintained by means of discarding or biasing negative information 
through a series of social and cognitive filters. Positive cognitive schemas are 
substantial for normal mental functioning as they generate positive affect and 
self-esteem, and are important characteristics of mentally healthy individuals. 
This approach to self-enhancing illusions has significant implications, not only 
for social and personality psychology, but also for clinical psychology and 
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Determinants of the illusion of control
Langer (1975) was also the first to report that some characteristics of 
skill situations influence the illusion of control. For example, if an element 
of competition is introduced into a skill situation, subjects obtain illusive 
experience of control. Other factors that influence the creation of the illusion 
are: choice possibility (e.g. if a lottery participant has a chance to choose a 
ticket), familiarity (e.g. if a lottery participant is familiar with the picture on the 
ticket), as well as personal engagement vs. passivity (e.g. if a participant has an 
opportunity to practice activities connected with the chance situations).
The researchers of illusion of control suggested that other important 
factors also play significant role in illusion forming or reducing the illusion, 
such as: perceived success in the situation (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Gollwitzer 
& Kinney, 1989; Matute, 1995), a real degree of control (Gino, Sharek & 
Moore, 2011), the focus of attention on objective aspects of the situation – so 
cold “intrusion of the reality” (Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998), some 
personality traits, such as attributional style, or perception-of-control style 
(Alloy, Kelly, Mineka, & Clements, 1990), locus of control (Rotter, 1966), and 
desirability of control (Burger, 1984).
Affect and the illusion of control
The mood is also considered to be an important moderator of the illusion 
of control. Past research has demonstrated that depressed people are relatively 
“immune” to the illusion of control, and that the susceptibility to the illusion 
can be manipulated by induction of affect (Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981). 
Induction of depressed mood reduced biased perception of control, whereas 
induction of elated mood (even in depressed individuals) augmented this 
irrational belief. The decreased liability to the illusion of the control of depressed 
patients, and subjects with induced depressed mood, was named „depressive 
realism“ or „sadder but wiser effect“ (Alloy & Abramson, 1979).
In another study, it was assumed that proneness to the illusion of control is 
an indicator of resilience to depression, whereas “depressive realism” indicates 
vulnerability to depression. As a matter of fact, the data suggested that an 
inclination to the illusion of control reduced the probability of negative affective 
reaction following experimentally induced failure. In addition, people who were 
prone to illusion of control have been significantly less discouraged and less 
desperate in the face of real-life negative life events (Alloy & Clements, 1992).
These two studies threw an oposite light on causal relationship between 
the mood and the illusion of control. The first study (Alloy et al, 1981) indicates 
that the mood had influence the illusion while the latter (Alloy & Clements, 
1992) suggestes that the illusion of control can protect from depression. Thus, 
there is a possibility of a positive feedback loop: with the illusion having a 
mood-enhancing effect; and in turn, the elation having an enhancing effect on 
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Curiously, there were very few attempts to directly study the relationship 
between the positive mood and the illusion of control in which positive mood 
would be directly measured. So far, majority of studies have focused on the 
relationship between the illusion and the negative affective states. For instance, 
Alloy and her colleagues (1981) have measured three negative affective states 
(depression, anxiety and hostility) and none of the positive, with the assumption 
that induction of the illusion will reduce them. We therefore still do not know 
whether the illusion of control in non-depressed individuals is causally related to 
the negative, or positive mood, or both. Also, we still do not know what oposes 
the illusion of control in depressed individuals: is it the (low) positive or the 
(high) negative affect, or both of them.
The need for separate measurement of positive and negative affective 
states related to the illusion of control, comes from the theory and research of 
Tellegen, and his colleagues. They suggested two-factor model of affect which 
can capture robust structural properties of self-rated mood (Watson & Tellegen, 
1985). The model emphasised fundamental distinction between positive and 
negative affective experiences (PA and NA), as broad orthogonal dimensions 
which included specific positive and negative emotions. Watson and Clark 
reported that correlations between PA an NA ranged between –0.05 and –.35 
(Watson & Clark, 1994), suggesting „quasi-independence” of these dimensions. 
The authors od two-factor model of affect operationalyzed it by Positive And 
Negative Affect Shedule – PANAS, and later by extended PANAS-X scales, as 
measurs of general PA and NA dimensions, as well as speciffic affects of which 
they are comprised. PANAS scales exhibited a significant level of stability 
reflecting the strong dispositional (trait) component of affect (Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988; Watson & Clark, 1994). The same group of authors related 
depressive affect to both low PA and high NA, suggesting that this combination 
of afects is specific for depression as oposed to anxiety (Watson, 2005).
As the illusion of control related studies mainly researched the effects 
of negative affect, or depression, we wondered if PA and NA, being two 
inedependent aspects of depression, could be related to illusion of control in a 
different way. Since PA and NA have their trait, e.g. dispositional, as well as state 
expressions, the question arises as to what is the relation of the predisposition 
for enduring positive and negative mood states to the illusion of control. Is 
it different than the effect of transitory mood states? And finally, we wanted 
to explore the relation of the illusion of control to the affect that is emerging 
concurrently with a situation which is inducing enhanced control.
This study was designed to address all these questions, capitalizing on the 
assessment of the positive and the negative affect before and after the induction 
of the illusion, and on the assessments of permanent and transitory affective 
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Method
Sample. The ad hoc sample consisted of 54 first-year Psychology students (41 women and 13 
men, average age 19 years) from the University of Novi Sad, Serbia who have participated 
in both phases of the study. Since there was no statistical gender-related difference in the 
assessment of control (t51=0.09; p=0.92), information about respondents’ gender was excluded 
from all ensuing statistical analyses.
Instruments.  Serbian Inventory of Affect Based on Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(SIAB-PANAS;  Novović, Mihić, Tovilović, & Jovanović, 2008), a Serbian adaptation of 
PANAS (Watson & Clark, 1994), is a 20-item self-report measure of Positive (PA) and 
Negative affect (NA). In this study we have used both the state and trait version of the 
scale by giving two consecutive different instructions to the subjects (“at this moment” or 
“generally”). Previously, we have demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency for both the 
PA (α = 0.83) and the NA (α = 0.83) subscale (Novović et al., 2008).
For the purpose of this study the original 20 items of the state-SIAB PANAS were 
divided in two parallel forms each containing 10 items (5 for PA and 5 for NA). This was 
done in order to obtain Form I (for the pretest) and Form II (for the post-test) of the scale, 
enabling us to assess PA and NA, both immediately before, and immediately after the illusion 
of control induction task. Descriptive statistics and correlations between scores of two forms 
are given in table 2.
Attributions of success on the experimental task were measured as responses on two 
independent 7-degree Likert scales. Respondents were asked to report their assessment about 
to what extent has luck and skills attributed to their success (ranging from 1 – not at all, to 
7 – completely).
Judgment of control was measured as response to a single 10-degree Likert item 
examining respondents’ belief about their control over the favourable outcome of the task.
Illusion of control induction task involved computer-generated presentation of 18 
different slides displayed consecutively in a Power Point presentation. Each slide depicted an 
abstract shape, an unusually shaped archaic object or a microscopic enlargement of some small 
particle. In this way, it was impossible for our subjects to correctly answer the question: what 
is in this picture, what does it represent? This question was asked following the presentation 
of each slide and respondents were offered three incorrect answers to choose from. Following 
the completion of the task, all respondents’ protocols were ‘graded’ and ‘grades’ were 
randomly distributed within the 89% to 100% range (between 16 and 18 ‘correct’ answers). 
Consequently, each respondent was told that her/his achievement on the test corresponds to an 
IQ score above 130. Thus, all respondents have received a positive feedback.
Procedure. During the preliminary phase of the study, after giving informed consent, the trait 
version of the SIAB-PANAS scale was administered to the respondents, and they were told 
that their participation in the next phase of the study was expected after 2 weeks. At this 
stage the respondents were blinded with respect to the real purpose of the study. Instead, the 
researcher explained that she was investigating a possible connection between the IQ and 
some unspecified psychological phenomena and that the real purpose of the study will be 
revealed following its completion in order to avoid any contamination of the data. In the 
second phase of the study, the respondents were administered the first half of the state form 
of the SIAB-PANAS2 (form I) comprising five items on the PA subscale and five items on the 
NA subscale (see Table 1 for the summery of the procedure).
2  Later in the text we refere to these two forms as PA and NA state before, and PA and NA 
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Table 1. Summary of the procedure 
2 weeks before 
the illusion of 
control induction 
task
Pre-test – 
immediately before 
the illusion of control 
induction task
Illusion 
of control 
induction task
Post-test – immediately 
after the illusion of control 
induction task
SIAB-PANAS – 
as a trait
SIAB-PANAS – as a 
state – form I
The task 
+ positive 
feedback
Assessment of control + 
Assessment of attribution + 
SIAB-PANAS – as a state 
– Form II
Following pretest, the respondents were presented with the illusion of control induction 
task. They received the positive feedback, and completed the attribution of success and 
judgment of control scales. Finally, the remaining 10 items of the state SIAB-PANAS scale 
(form II) were used as parallel form of the scale at retest. At the next lab meeting, respondents 
were debriefed and the real purpose of the study was revealed.
Results
Manipulation check – success in illusion of control induction
Success in illusion of control induction was verified by intensity of 
subjects’ beliefs that their skills, and not sheer luck, are responsible for their 
almost perfect completion of the task. As a matter of fact, respondents were 
more prone to attribute their success to their skills than to luck: M1 = 3.94 (1, 
86) and M2 = 3.22 (1, 54) respectively; t(53) = 2.20; p=0.03, Cohen’s d =0.25 
for within subjects’ data. Average judgment of control on a 10-degree Likert 
scale (ranging from absolutely no control to absolute control) was M = 7.22; 
SD = 2.36 indicating that majority of respondents possessed a strong feeling 
of control over a chance outcome. Taken together, these data indicate that our 
experimental manipulation induced cognitive fallacy in our respondents since 
they viewed their success as being under their control.
Descriptive statistics and bivariate linear relationship between affect and the 
illusion of control
Table 2 summarizes linear relationship between illusion of control and PA 
or NA affect, measured either as a trait or a state. It also offers descriptives for 
all variables included in the study. Because the distributions of NA variables 
were significantly skewed (skewness was 1.11; 1.91; 1.81 for trait NA, NA 
before and NA after induction task, respectively), we normalized variables using 
Blom’s formula in subsequent analysis.
The illusory judgement significantly correlated with all three forms of PA: 
as a trait, as a state before and a state after induction of the illusion. Interestingly, 
NA in any form had no correlation with the illusion of control. As expected, 
different forms of NA positively correlated among themselves, and negatively 
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Table 2. Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics
for different measures of affect and estimate of control
Estimate 
of control
PA
as a trait
NA
as a trait
PA
as a state 
before
NA
as a state 
before
PA
as a state 
after
NA
as a state 
after
PA as a trait 0.35**
NA as a trait –0.05** –0.44**
PA as a state before 0.39** 0.53** –0.37**
NA as a state before –0.17** –0.40** 0.59** –0.21**
PA as a state after 0.49** 0.45** –0.25** 0.70** –0.26*
NA as a state after –0.14** –0.23** 0.44** –0.11** 0.78** –0.20*
Means 
(SD)
7,27**
(2,35)**
35,15**
(5,61)**
19,78**
(7,67)**
13,26**
(3,99)**
6,83*
(2,25)*
13,65*
(4,72)*
6,76*
(2,23)*
 **p<0.01  *p<0.05
Affective predictors of illusion of control
Hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the role of affectivity 
in induction of illusion of control. Subjects’ judgment of control (response on a 
single 10-degree Likert item examining one’s belief about her/his control over 
the favourable outcome of the task) was used as a criterion variable. Predictor 
variables involved PA and NA as traits (Model 1), as well as PA and NA as states 
before and after the task3 (Model 2). Controlling the trait variables allowed us to 
establish relative contributions of transitory affective states, over and above the 
general proneness to PA and NA.
Table 3. Hierarchical regression analysis: affective predictors of estimate of control
Model Predictors B Beta sr2 R2 ∆R2 F ∆F 
1 PA as trait .38 ,41** .13** .14 .14 4.21* 4.21*
NA as trait .10 ,11 .01
2 PA as trait .20 .21 .03 .28 .14 3.10* 2.33†
NA as trait .18 .19 .02
PA as state before ,06 .06 .00
NA as state before ,00 ,00 .00
PA as state after ,34 ,36* .06**
NA as state after -,14 -,13 .00
  **p<.01 *p<.05 †p=.07
3  Although state PA and NA in retest were measured after the questions about control, we 
supposed that we captured affect that was concurrent with enhancing sense of control, 
and that this affect was not changed by the very question about control. That’s why we 
considered that posttest affect could be treated as predictor in the regression analysis.  POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT IN ILLUSION OF CONTROL 402
Both regression models displayed significant predictive power (Fs p<0.05) 
and Model 2 shows marginally significant increase of prediction. It is also 
obvious that PA was essential for perception of control. According to Model 1, 
lasting tendency towards PA is a significant predictor of perception of control 
accounting for over 13% of total variability of the criterion variable.
Model 2, introducing affective states before and after the task as 
predictors, also indicates significant predictive power of PA and not NA. The 
beta coefficient of transitory PA after the task is significant (p=0.04), as well 
as its unique contribution to explained variance (6%). Due to significant inter-
correlations among the three PA variables their individual predictive power is 
diminished in Model 2. Nevertheless, the conclusion about superior importance 
of PA relative to NA still holds. Cohen’s ƒ2 effect size measure for Hierarchical 
regression analysis (0.21) is of medium size (Cohen, 1988).
DISCUSSION
So far, it has been established that depressed mood is among factors 
countering the illusion of control. Depressed subjects, relative to their 
undepressed counterparts, more realistically assess their control over events that 
are noncontingent on their actions (Presson & Benassi, 2003). The fostering 
effect of PA on the illusion was assumed based on the negative effect of 
depression and NA. Our study clearly demonstrates the positive effect of PA on 
the induction of the illusion.
Previous studies suggested independence between the PA and NA, the two 
broad dimensions of affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1994). In our study, similarly 
to those of other authors (e.g. Watson & Clark, 1994), correlation between PA 
and NA ranges between –0.20 (correlation between PA and NA measured as 
states after induction of the illusion) and –0.48 (between trait PA and NA). Thus, 
one can not draw conclusions about PA’s effect on the illusion of control based 
on NA’s effect. Here we found that NA had no significant effect on the illusory 
perception of control regardless of the time (before or after the induction of the 
illusion) or the mode (measured as a trait or as a state) of assessment. Our data 
strongly suggest that pronounced PA, rather than NA, is related to illusion of 
control.
Our results, showing significant predictive relationship between the 
illusion and PA, but not with NA, look contradictory to several previous reports 
documenting relationship between depression, and the illusion (e.g. Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979; Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981; Alloy & Clements, 1992). 
According to Watson’s hierarchical model (Watson, 2005), depression entails 
symptoms that are based on high NA (distress and negative emotions), but also 
the symptoms that are based on low PA (loss of enthusiasm, joy of life, ability to 
enjoy everyday routines, general loss of motivation and the like). Thus, our data 
suggest that depression is acting against the illusion of control, rather through 
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illusion of control since it enables the rise of PA. Some recent research also 
supports this line of reasoning in pathological states. In a clinically depressed 
sample,  positive self-bias (another self-enhancement illusion) decreased as 
severity of anhedonia (syndromal expression of low PA) increased across 
three different symptom measures of depression (Dunn, Stefanovitch, Buchan, 
Lawrence & Dalgleish, 2009).
Because we have measured affectivity on three different occasions, and 
either as a trait, or a state (before and after the induction of the illusion), our data 
allow us to comment on the role of the mood that has appeared simultaneously 
with the illusion of control, relative to the mood preceding the induction 
of the illusion. Although all measures of PA significantly correlated with the 
illusion (Table 2), bivariate correlation between the illusion of control and PA 
measured after the induction was the highest of the three. Due to significant 
partial contribution of the predictor variable “PA after the induction” to 
multiple regressions Model 2 (Table 3), we can assume that the task-induced 
PA contributed mostly to the cognitive bias. The predictor variable “PA after 
the induction” contributes to explanation of the criterion variable (illusion of 
control) above the variance that was already explained by the variables “PA 
before the induction” and “PA as a trait”.
The very correlational nature of our findings allows us at least two 
interpretations: that our induction procedure induced PA which enabled 
the illusory judgement, but also a reversed interpretation of the observed 
relationship. It may well be that the induction of the illusion of control and 
the ensuing perception of success have induced the PA. Significant relation of 
PA and the illusion that was demonstrated here could be a consequence of the 
fact that our respondents assessed their control over a successfully completed 
task. Our respondents were in a situation that was best described as a success. 
Congruence between valence of the affect and the situation to which control is 
attributed to, could, therefore, be responsible for biased attribution of control for 
a purpose of maintaining PA.
This interpretation of the data can be related to several hypotheses 
accounting for congruency of affect and cognitive operations. Isen and Patrick 
(1983) argues that people have a tendency for maintaining positive mood and are 
avoiding situations that can disrupt it, so they use cognitive process in accordance 
with this purpose. Similarly, Johnson and Tversky (1983) demonstrate that 
exposure to information eliciting NA increases perceived (assessed) frequency 
of negative events even if those events are not directly related to the information 
that has elicited NA. Furthermore, they have shown that experimentally-induced 
PA also affected cognition: subjects’ risk assessments were reduced. Both 
accounts suggest the interplay of cognition and affect in which predominant 
affect should be maintained by means of cognition.
While Isen and Patrick and Johnson and Tversky describe how cognitive 
manipulation helps perseverance of affective states, and vice versa, Wegener et al. 
have developed a „hedonic contingency model“ which tries to explain why this 
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for the critical role of PA in induction of the illusion of control, as suggested by 
our data. Wegener et al. hypothesize that „behaviors resulting in more positive 
than negative feelings are rewarded while behaviors resulting in fewer positive 
than negative feelings are punished“ (Wegener & Petty, 1994, p. 1035). Thus, 
different patterns of reinforcement are at work in people experiencing PA from 
the ones experiencing NA. We learn affective consequences of our behaviour 
and what activities are instrumental in maintaining and intensifying our PA state 
of mind. Wegener and Petty further state that people with PA are more prone to 
mood management strategies, because they can not easily find the action which 
is in adequate hedonic relationship with their current affective state. Therefore 
they must search carefully to find the action that would be rewarded, and 
when they find it, the action and mood being contingent, their mood managing 
strategies are rewarded. Our results suggest that people, who were higher on 
PA, were more prone to overestimate control, thus making their success more 
valuable, leading them to more PA. On the other hand, people who are higher in 
NA mood, according to Wegener and Petty (1994), are not contingently rewarded 
for mood managing strategies, because hedonic rewards are relatively likely to 
occur, and almost any action leads to more positive consequence. As people with 
more NA are not conditioned to use mood managing strategies, this might be the 
reason why NA is not related to estimation of control over success as a strategy 
for achieving more valuable success and more PA in our study.
The relation of PA and illusory judgement can offer an additional 
explanation of the relationship between depression and proneness to the illusion 
rivalling the one offered by Alloy & Clements (1992), who claimed that illusion 
of control can protect from depression. If the general tendency towards PA 
(PA as a trait) is a factor that increases the tendency to illusion, then affective 
disposition can be an indicator of resilience to depression, while the illusion 
might be only one among other correlates (probably together with other cognitive 
biases) helping to maintain the positive mood (Isen & Patrick, 1983; Johnson & 
Tversky, 1983; Wegener & Petty, 1994).
Theoretical and practical implications of our findings are pertinent to 
established importance of PA to mental health (Koivumaa-Honkanen et al., 
2001) and success in personal domains such as marriage, friendship, income 
and physical health (Lyubomirsky, King & Diener, 2005). Over the last decade, 
general significance of PA for individual well-being is recognised in positive 
psychotherapy (Seligman, Rashid & Parks, 2006), positive affect training (Leeds, 
2009), and mindfulness-based cognitive psychotherapy (Teasdale, et al., 2000).
The greatest limitation of our study is that the sample was from general 
population (students). Therefore, the conclusions about what happens with 
clinically depressed patients could not be drawn. Our results suggest that NA is 
not important for illusory thinking, and this also means that rising NA doesn’t 
help in accurate control judgement in nonclinical population. We cannot conclude 
anything about the role of NA, as well as PA in more depressed individuals 
whose symptom lavel satisfies the criteria of the disorder. As we noted earlier, 
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important role in patients (Dunn et al., 2009). Nevertheless, a study similar to 
ours, having to do with a clinically depressed sample, would be desirable.
The omission of a control group can be seen as a potential limitation of 
our study. Control group would serve as a proof that we really induced illusion 
of control, and such group should solve the same unsolvable tasks with negative 
feedback, or solve different solvable tasks with true feedback. Therefore, it 
would be difficult to compare the results of those groups with the results of 
our group. Also, based on the differences between groups we would still not 
have been able to conclude why our experimental group had had higher sense of 
control. Is it because of bias in our group, because uncontrollable negative group 
had bias, or because group with real feedback had lesser sense of control since 
they had different kind of tasks? The great majority of papers on illusion of 
control suggest that differences in groups with and without induction procedure 
cannot be used for concluding that in a group with the induction the illusion of 
control is really induced. This difference can only indicate that one group has a 
greater sense of control. Illusory judgements of control can only be demonstrated 
by means of a standard, which is an objective measure of control (Presson & 
Benassi, 1996). In our study, participants’ estimation of control, which was 
greater then zero in the situation with no objective control, indicated that we 
really induced the illusion. Our research question was about the role of positive 
and negative affect in different occasions, and of different duration as well, and 
this question required within-subject design.
CONCLUSIONS
Positive and not negative affect is a relevant predictor of the overevaluation 
of control over positive uncontrollable situation.
Disposition to experience PA is strong predictor of illusion of control, 
but transitory affect induced by illusion of control significantly adds to the 
explanation of the enhanced perception of the control.
Illusion of control could be mood management strategy that people with 
higher PA may be using to stay in that affective state.
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